In April 1966,"2 O'Callahan petitioned the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the court-martial had no jurisdiction to try him for a non-military offense committed while on leave." The district court refused to consider that issue since O'Callahan had formerly obtained an unfavorable ruling from the district court in Massachusetts where he had once been confined. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the Pennsylvania court without discussion of the question." On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts by holding that the crimes for which O'Callahan was convicted were not "service connected," and therefore not triable by court-martial. 6 accused must petition for review but the court must hear every request for review involving capital sentences. Generally review is limited to matters of law by Art. 69(d) , but under extreme conditions it can hear mixed questions of law and fact.
The President as commander-in-chief holds final appellate authority. But he, as any other appeal body, cannot increase the court-martial sentence. M. ComsKY 1'The other allegations unsuccessfully raised in the writ were: (a) that his confession, which had been admitted in evidence without objection, had been obtained by use of coercion; (b) that testimony by use of written interrogatories had been admitted into evidence violating his sixth amendment right to confrontation of witnesses; (c) that his conviction by twothirds vote rather than by unanimity violated his consitutional right to trial by jury. § 2244 (1948) permits, in part, a district judge to refuse to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus where a prior application on the same grounds has been denied pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States. Chief Judge Wyzanski had denied the Massachusetts writ of habeas corpus stating "there is no merit in plaintiff's position, which conflicts with an unbroken line of contrary authority." O'Callahan v. United States Marshal, 293 F. Supp. 441, 442 0D. Mass. 1966) .
"6 United States ex rel O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968) . Judge Hastie relied upon Thompson v. Willingham, 318 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963 ) in determining that the court-martial had jurisdiction. Thompson had alleged that a military court held no jurisdiction over him for a capital offense in time of peace.
16O 'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) . The Court defined the issue as follows:
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War, Tit. 10 U.S.C. § 801 el seq., have jurisdiction to try a member of the Armed Forces who is Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas emphasized that the offenses in question were committed off duty and off post by a soldier dressed in civilian garb. O'Callahan's conduct, it was held, represented a "civilian" offense against a civilian victim. In establishing no service connection, 17 the majority further noted that peacetime offenses were involved which had been "committed within our territorial limits, not an occupied zone of a foreign country." ' 8 The Court ignored the government's contention that status as a member of the Armed Forces granted military jurisdiction. As Mr. Justice Douglas phrased it, That is merely the beginning of the inquiry, not its end. Status is necessary for jurisdiction; but it does not follow that ascertainment of status completes the inquiry, regardless of nature, time, and place of the offense.
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The majority compared military tribunals with federal courts and concluded that courts-martial are not entitled "to rank along with Article Im courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life, liberty, or property." 20 It was asserted that "a court-martial is not yet an charged with commission of a crime cognizable in a civilian court and having no military significance alleged to have been committed off-post and while on leave, thus depriving him of his constitutional rights to indictment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court? 395 U.S. at 261. The U.C.M.J. replaced the Articles of War in 1951. Act of May 5, 1950, 64 Stat. 108 .
It was a 5-3 decision. Together with Justice Douglas in the majority stood Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Brennan and Marshall.
1" O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969) . 11 Id. at 273-74.
19 Id. at 267.
0 Id. at 262. In that comparison, the Court observed that federal judges are appointed for life and that their salaries may not be diminished, whereas their military counterparts do not have the benefit of such constitutional protections. Military judges, it was asserted, are subject to the "will of the executive department which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them." Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). The Court frowned on a military system in which the guilt of a soldier can be established by two-thirds of the court-martial as compared to the civilian system in which a unanimous jury decision is required for a finding of guilty. Finally, the Court noted the unique character of the authority vested by the military judicial system in the officer who convenes a courtmartial-in particular the power he holds to appoint not only members of the court but counsel for both sides as well. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1969).
[Vol 61 independent instrument of justice" 21 and that Anglo-American history supported the proposition that a soldier could not be tried by court-martial for civilian type offenses. 22 The conclusion of the Court naturally followed:
[A soldier's] crime to be under military jurisdiction must be service-connected, lest "cases arising in. the land and naval forces or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger," as used in the Fifth Amendment, be expanded to deprive every member of the armed services of the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury of his peers.P Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Stewart and White, strongly dissented. Harlan asserted that the majority had usurped Congress's constitutional power to determine the "appropriate subject matter jurisdiction of courts-martial. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969). 4 Id. at 276. Congress's power derives from the language of Art. I, sec., 8, cl. 14 of the Constitution which grants to Congress the power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." In Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U. S. 234 (1960) , that constitutional language was reviewed and the assertion made that military jurisdiction was based upon whether a person could be regarded as falling within the term "land and naval forces." Id. at 241. Given the constitutional language, it would be for Congress and not the Judiciary to determine subject matter jurisdiction of courts-martial. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1879). 
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in O'Callahan analyzed that conflict. He noted that "the King's asserted prerogative to try soldiers by court-martial in time of peace" was one point of contention in the "long standing... struggle for power between the military and the Crown on the one hand and Parliament on the other." 14 The fact that military law proved so harsh, he argued, made it understandable that a Parliament vested with exclusive authority over the military would use it sparingly.
5 Harlan concluded that in that tradition control of the military must remain in the hands of the people through their representatives in Congress. The adoption of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 represented American affirmation of that principle, for it vested in Congress authority "[tlo make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval Forces."
The O'Callahan majority pointed to early instances of the assertion of legislative control over the military as precedence for its contemporary move to restrict court-martial jurisdiction. In particular, reference was made to the Articles of War of 1776.3 6 That act did require that the soldier accused of a civilian offense be delivered to a civil magistrate, but only after a request had been made for such delivery. When no request was received from civilian authorities, the commanding officer was required to insure that disciplinary action was taken against his officers and men for the offenses in question. Indeed, if an officer failed to intitiate O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 276 (1969 A noted military historian has written that crimes were cognizable by a court-martial under the General Article only when "committed under such circumstances as to have directly offended against the government and discipline of the military state." 49 However, he later commented that the strict interpretation of the General Article had not been realized in practice. As long as commanders instituted courts-martial for crimes commited against civilians, civil courts avoided such cases."
Support for the propriety of that broadened approach to the authority of courts-martial over soldiers received support with the Supreme Court's comments on the "General Article" in Grafton v. United States. 
The crimes referred to in [the
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8 Id. at 49. It is doubtful that Mr. Justice Douglas would find service connection today for many of the cases he summarily dismissed from the government's list because of their "military significance." E.g., in a case in which a soldier absented himself from camp without leave and rioted in Cincinnati, the fact that the soldier was AWOL at the time he was arrested for his role in the civil disturbance in question would hardly be sufficient grounds for a finding of service connection. The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy required other and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts; and, in pursuance of the power conferred by the Constitution, Congress has declared the kinds of trial, and the manner in which they shall be conducted, for offenses committed while the party is in the military or naval service. Every one connected with these branches of the public service is amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has created for their government, and, while thus serving, surrenders his right to be tried by the civil courts." jurisdiction over a member of the occupying army. In holding that the Army possessed exclusive jurisdiction the Court asserted, As Congress is expressly authorized by the Constitution "to raise and support armies," and "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," its control over the whole subject of the formation, organization and government of the national armies, including therein the punishment of offenses committed by persons in the military service, would seem to be plenary6A
As recently as 1960, the case of Kinsella v. United States7 forwarded military status as the jurisdictional foundation for the power of courtsmartial over members of the Armed Forces.
The test for jurisdiction... is one of status, namely whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person who can be regarded as falling within the term "land and naval forces." M The O'Callahan majority attempted to overcome the weight of such precedents.
9 Difficult to deny, however, was the reality of a tradition of military justice in the United States based upon an understanding that Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 empowered Congress to establish discipline for citizens "in the land and naval forces. In its distrust of military justice, the majority stressed the significance of affording the uniformed defendant two right's of the accused civilianindictment by grand jury and jury trial. The Court failed to recognize that a grand jury would provide questionable advantage to the accused serviceman. The grand jury procedure often represents an oppressive tool of the prosecutox" since such proceedings are held in secrecy without the presence of the accused or his counsel. The same cannot be said of the military equivalent-the Article 4269 investigation. The article provides that prior to each general court-martial a thorough hearing must be conducted at which the accused may be present and represented by counsel.
1 The investigating officer must call all available witnesses whom the accused is entitled to cross-examine' his unit or vessel is alerted and relocated, he will be left behind. Military courts dispose of cases swiftly with punishment for guilt often leaving the soldier in a duty status encouraging his rehabilitation.
A defendant found guilty would be retained in duty status under any of the following sentences: reprimand or admonishment; restriction; hard labor without confinement; forfeiture, fine or detention of pay; and reduction in rank. MAxu~A roR COURTs-MART=L, para.
(1969).
Army statistics for 1967 indicate that 85% of the cases involving serious offenses committed off post were retained by the civilian authorities. Brief for Respondent at 27 n. 19 Article 32 reads in part as follows: No charge or specification may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters set forth therein has been made. This investigation shall include inquiry as to the truth of the matter set forth in the charges, consideration of the form of the charges, and a recommendation as to the disposition which should be made of the case in the interest of justice and discipline U.C.MJ. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1968).
70The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his right to be represented at that investigation by counsel. Upon his own request he shall be represented by civilian counsel if provided by him, or military counsel of his own selection if such counsel is reasonably available, or by counsel detailed by the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command. U.C.M.J. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1968).
n It is not the function of the investigating officer to perfect a case against the accused, but to ascertain and impartially weigh all available facts in arriving at his conclusion. MANUAL FOR COUMrS-MARTIAL, para. 34 at 7-9.
The suspect himself may call witnesses, enter evidence, or testify on his own behalf.2
Trial by jury may seem most desirable as well. But is the accused serviceman a peer of the community just outside the gate? In Orloff v. Willoughby, 73 the Court acknowledged that "the military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian."
74 The soldier does not choose where he is to be stationed. Many times local civilian inhabitants house antagonism toward members of the military who are stationed near their community, especially those of different ethnic or racial backgrounds. Jury trial, then, may well provide no benefit to the serviceman accused of criminal conduct far from his home.
The Judiciary's call for new restrictions on court-martial jurisdiction was based upon a distrust of the military judicial system coupled with the expressed need to afford certain military defendants the civil amenities of grand jury and jury trial proceedings. Disagreement over the strength of such arguments as the basis for the overthrow of well established principles of military jurisdiction continued unabated. No more satisfactory was the fact that the O'Callahan opinion left unexplained the new jurisdictional standard. What were the proper bounds of "service connected" crime?
Justice Harlan, alarmed by the majority's failure to define "service connection", proclaimed, Whatever role an ad hoc judicial approach may have in some areas of the law, the Congress and the military are at least entitled to know with some certainty the allowable scope of courtmartial jurisdictionY 7 The extent of confusion over jurisdictional standards in the wake of O'Callahan soon became apparent.
The Court of Military Appeals quickly initiated the task of interpreting the decision and handling 72 At that investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. Quirn's dissent noted that defendant Borys' offenses had occurred off base in Georgia and South Carolina. He stressed the fact that federal and state governments remained separate sovereigns vested with authority to determine what action would be criminal within their jurisdictions. That a state criminal code declared a particular act criminal in no way limited the federal power of Congress to grant to the military jurisdiction over its personnel responsible for such criminal conduct. 81 Quinn reasoned that Borys' offenses were not cognizable in a civilian court since civilian court as used in O'Callahan meant federal court.P Furthermore, the dissent viewed Borys' misconduct as militarily significant tolling service connection. Congress, it was argued, had exercised its power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 to make rules for government and regulation of the Armed Forces in order to afford federal protection of the civilian population from the military. Congress sanctioned courts-martial for that purpose. Military status of an accused in his alleged misconduct toward a civilian would properly precipitate court-martial action in light of Congress's jurisdictional grant.P (1968) . If the girl involved in a rape case were fifteen and not of previously chaste character, the offense would be cognizable in a Hawaii court but not in Florida. Quinn, assuming arguendo that "cognizable in a civilian court" meant either state or federal court, showed that the military would be able to court-martial the service member in Florida but not Hawaii. That would mean that the ability of Congress to exercise its enumerated constitutional power over the military would, in fact, be controlled in part by each state's determination as to what acts are criminal in that state. United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M. A. 547, 556-7 (1969 8 The situs of a serviceman's criminal conduct was termed one factor in resolving the service connection question. Authority to govern its own posts invested the military with authority to act in insuring their safety. Crimes committed on base were to be dealt with by a court-martial.
This standard was invoked in United Stakes v. Crapo.P Defendant Crapo stood convicted of robbery and attempted robbery. His two victims were taxicab drivers. One was attacked on a military reservations and the other in Seattle, Washington. On appeal, court-martial conviction that of O'Cailahan in decrying judicial assault upon the traditional scope of court-martial jurisdiction.
84The jurisdictional watchword in O'Callakan remained largely undefined. The Court's creation of the "service connection" standard was not designed to question court-martial jurisdiction over many cases. The military's authority to court-martial a soldier for desertion or for wilful disobedience of the lawful order of a superior officer remained unchallenged. But concern arose as to designation of the proper forum to handle cases involving servicemen's crimes in which "service connection", or the lack thereof, was not so clear. -18 U.S.C.M.A. 594 (1969). 8 The driver was struck over the head on the reservation but was forced to drive off the base before defendant Crapo took his money. Id. at 595-96.
for the attempted robbery in Seattle was reversed. Conviction for the on-base offense was affirmed.
9
The situs criterion if strictly applied would bring within court-martial jurisdiction cases which in no way involved the security of a military post. For instance, a serviceman's preparation of a fraudulent income tax form or his forgery of a check to be cashed off base would fit that category. That the Court of Military Appeals may have established too broad a standard proved no problem. Exceptions to that general jurisdictional rule were soon recognized. 0 Furthermore, the broad general rule was workable. The Court of Military Appeals had recognized that military trial and lower appellate courts were awaiting guidelines to assist them in sorting out the O'Callahan puzzle. Anything less than a jurisdictional standard simple in application would have left the lower courts in a continuing state of uncertainty. would only be available through the civil courts of the United States. It noted that "military courts [alone] are authorized to function within the Republic of the Philippines." 93 The Keaton court stated that while some offenses committed abroad are triable in the federal civilian courts, "the number and kind of offenses in which such action can be taken is limited." 91 The Supreme Court, it was added, did not intend to proscribe courtmartial jurisdiction in friendly foreign countries. Court-martial jurisdiction over defendants charged with offenses in a foreign land represented a "valid exercise of constitutional authority." 91 Specific offenses as well were found by their very nature to be service connected. In United States v. Beeker 9 5, for instance, the Court of Military Appeals reaffirmed jurisdictional guidelines for treatment of drug cases involving military personnel.
Beeker had been convicted of numerous marijuana offenses-unlawful importation and transportation; wrongful possession on a military post; wrongful use off and on post. In addition, the petty offenses of military men had long been tried by courts-martial.
3 O'Callahan's denial of military jurisdiction over cases in3Id. at 67. 9 Id. at 67. 
